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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]
]1 Fourth Judicial District
I No. CR-88-294
Court of Appeals Docket No.
i 890350-CA
j

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN, and
GREGORY SOUTHERN,

i Argument Priority
]i Classification No. 2

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether the police officer properly stopped the

Defendants for the violation of following too closely and whether
the stop can be justified under both the Federal and State
Constitutions?
II.

Whether the amount of time that the officer detained

the Defendants coupled with the degree of aggressiveness and
coerciveness exhibited by the officer towards the Defendants
amounted to a de facto arrest?
III.

Whether the officer had a reasonable and articulable

suspicion sufficient to justify

A) a pat-down search for weapons

of the passenger pursuant to Terry v. Ohio and Section 77-7-16,
Utah Code; and B) could the officer lawfully use the keys found in
1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged on June 22, 1988, by criminal
information, with 1) Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Intent to Distribute, a Second (2nd) Degree Felony, a violation of
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended);
2) Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B
Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 58-37a-5(l), Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended); 3) Obstruction of Justice, a Class B
Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 76-8-3 06, Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended); 4) Open Container in Motor Vehicle, a Class B
Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 44-6-44.20, Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended); and 5) Interference with a Peace Officer, a
Class B Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 76-8-305, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended).
Defendants moved the District Court for the Fourth
Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding, to suppress all evidence seized
from the Defendants or from their automobile by officers of the
Utah Highway Patrol.
9, 1988.

A hearing was held on the motion on December

The Court held that the officer made a proper stop and

had sufficient reason to make a pat down search of Defendant
Southern, which resulted in the officer finding a set of keys in
Mr. Southern's pocket.

The Court further stated that it was of the

opinion that the keys were then taken by Defendant Lovegren, who
opened the trunk, removed the suitcase and opened it so that the
officer could look inside it.

The Court inferred that there was
3
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driver's license. (R. 8 ) . It was determined that the Defendant did
have a valid driver's license (R. 34) and that the contained a
valid vehicle registration in the Driver's brother's name. (R. 61).
The officer testified that each Appellant wore sun glasses which
"made them a little suspicious as to what was going on" (R. 9 ) .
While talking with the officer, the Driver removed his sunglasses.
The officer testified he noted his eyes were glassy and bloodshot
and associated the condition of the Defendant's eyes with drug
and/or alcohol use (R. 10). The officer also placed great emphasis
on the fact that the Defendant was nervous about all of the
questions that the officer was asking him (R. 10-11).
After the initial exchange, the officer issued a warning
citation for following too closely and escorted the Driver back to
his car where he asked the Passenger to produce a valid driver's
license, even though he knew that the Driver had one, and had no
reason to believe that the Driver was not the person who he claimed
to be (R. 11, 34). The Passenger stated that he did not have a
valid license (R. 12).
The officer asked the Passenger to remove his sunglasses
so that he could look at his eyes, which he concluded looked the
same as the Defendant's (R. 12). Though he conducted no field
sobriety test, nor smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage, nor
cited the Driver for driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, the officer testified he concluded that the Driver and his
Passenger were under the influence of "something" (R. 12-13, 5355) .
5

Because the inside of the car was cluttered, like the men
had been on a long trip, the officer further concluded that the
Driver and his Passenger were possible drug runners and resolved to
search their car (R. 34-38. See R. 28-29).

The officer testified

he asked for and received permission to search the interior of the
vehicle so that he might look for alcoholic beverages (R. 13).
However, the Driver and his Passenger testified that the officer at
no time asked for permission to search the interior of the car,
but that he told the two men to stand in front of the car and began
to search through its interior (R. 63-64, 73). The officer did not
have the Driver sign a consent to search form, even though one was
probably in his patrol vehicle (R. 58), and there is no evidence
that the officer ever told the Defendant that he had a right to
refuse to the search of the interior of his car.
The officer found a can of beer under the drivers seat
that was approximately one-fourth (1/4) full (R. 13, 35-36), but
testified he didn't know if it was still cold, or if it was warm
when he found it (R. 36). The Defendant denied having consumed any
alcoholic beverages (R. 12). The officer charged the Defendant
with having an open container of an alcoholic beverage in the
passenger compartment of the car.
Not finding anything else, the officer asked the Driver
and his Passenger where their luggage was. They stated they didn't
have any (R. 14). He then allegedly asked for permission to look
in the trunk of the car (R. 15), to which the Driver and his
Passenger allegedly consented (R. 16). Both Appellants testified,
6

however, that the officer never asked for or received consent to
open the trunk and to look through its contents (R. 65, 73-74).
The officer was not able to gain immediate access to the
trunk of the car because no key was available (R. 16). At this
point the officer decided that he was extremely nervous and decided
to search for "weapons" (R. 17)• The Driver, who was wearing a
mesh shirt and a pair of sweat pants, was not patted down (R. 18,
39-40).

The Passenger, who was wearing a tight pair of jeans and

no shirt at all, was patted down (R. 41, 64). During the pat-down
of the Passenger, the officer felt a small hard object with "some
length to it" inside of the Passenger's pocket (R. 41). The
officer reached into the pocket, without asking the Passenger what
it was, and pulled it from the pocket (R. 18, 44). The object was
recognized as possibly part of a key ring connector which may have
matched a key ring connector seen on the ignition key (R. 18, 44).
Attached to the connector taken from the Passenger's pocket were
car keys.

The officer commented that he "bet that they fit this

car" (R. 19).
The officer testified the Driver indicated that they
could now try to open the trunk with the key, and after a short
while of saying that the key did not fit, eventually opened the
trunk (R. 19). The Driver and the Passenger, however, each
testified the officer himself took the key and went to the trunk
and opened it (R. 65, R. 74). The officer, on cross examination,
modified his recollection to indicate that once the Driver

7

indicated that the key did not fit, or did not work, he may have
taken the keys from him and opened the trunk himself (R. 45).
Once the trunk was opened, the officer looked through a
trash bag containing dirty laundry.

This was allegedly with the

consent of the Driver (R. 22). According to the Passenger, the
Driver only stated that there was dirty laundry in the bag (R. 66).
The officer further testified he then asked for permission to look
in the two suitcases which were in the trunk of the car to which
the Driver replied that the suitcases were not his and that he had
no idea what was in them (R. 22, 66, 77-78), but that the officer
could look in them (R. 22), The Passenger denied such consent (R.
67) as did the Driver (R. 75).
The officer testified the Driver removed one suitcase
from the trunk, put it on the ground, opened it up and revealed its
contents (R. 22), then put a pair of levis on the top of a cookie
box, which was visible in the case, and showed the officer the
contents of the case, except for the cookie box (R. 23). The
officer stated that he then reached down and grasped the end of the
closed cookie box, squeezing the end of it so that he could see
inside it (R.23).

At the bottom of the box, beyond a row of

cookies, the officer observed a baggie containing a white powdered
substance (R. 23). At that point the Driver removed the box from
the officer claiming possession of it (R. 23). He then walked to
his car, sat in it for a moment, then exited the vehicle and threw
the box to the Passenger, who ran off with the box and it's
contents (R. 23-24).
8

Both Appellants testified the officer removed the
suitcase from the trunk, put it on the ground and opened it (R. 66,
74)•

The Driver then walked over to the officer, kneeled down

beside him, nudged him out of the way slightly, and showed the
officer the contents of the suitcase, except for the cookie box (R.
66, 75). The fact that clothes were placed on top of the cookie
box in order to conceal it is not denied by the Driver (R. 76).
Importantly, all three parties testified the officer did not ask
for or receive permission to look in the cookie box (R. 48, 57, 67,
76) .
Once the Passenger had departed with the cookie box in
his possession the Driver was arrested for possession of a
controlled substance (R. 25). The Passenger was arrested a short
while later in the same general area and the cookie box, with its
contents, was found after a search of the area (Arrest Report, p.
5).
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
Under the totality of the circumstances, and taking into
account all of the information known to the officer, and assessing
the officer's actions against a standard of a hypothetical
reasonable officer acting under the same situation, the officer
made a pretextual stop, and any evidence obtained as a result of
the pretextual stop should have been suppressed as seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
9

Additionally, the provisions of Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah are applicable to the facts of the case
and this Court would not be remiss in holding that those provisions
provide greater protection than does the comparable federal
provision.
POINT II
Because of length of time that Appellants were detaining
beyond the time reasonably necessary to issue the warning citation,
as well as the intrusive actions of the officer who used the
unnecessary extended period of detention as an opportunity to
search

the vehicle and the Passenger, a de facto arrest occurred

without support of probable cause. All evidence obtained as a
result of this arrest should have been suppressed by the trial
court.
POINT III
The pat-down search of the passenger was made without
reasonable suspicion that the passenger had or was attempting to
commit a public offense or that he was armed or a threat to the
officer. The keys taken from within the Passenger's pocket, not
being a weapon or contraband or otherwise illegal were not legally
seized or legally used by the offer in his subsequent search of the
vehicle.

Nervousness when in the presence of police, wearing

sunglasses during the summer, having a cluttered car, or possessing
a road map in a car are not reasonable indications that one is in
possession of controlled substances.

10

POINT IV
An examination of the record shows that the consent
claimed by the officer was in fact not given.

Even if the consent

had been given, the de facto arrest without supporting probable
cause served to coerce the consent.

If a valid consent was given

to the search of the interior and trunk of the car, it did not
extend logically to the cookie box.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE STOP OF APPELLANTS VEHICLE; THE STOP WAS A PRETEXT TO
CONDUCT A SEARCH AND WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
a

- The stop violated the protections guaranteed to
Appellants by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States

In determining whether a stop for a traffic violation and
subsequent arrest is a pretext, the totality of the circumstances
governs.

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 n.10

(1975); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988); See
U.S. v. Sokolow. 109 S.Ct 1581, 1585 (1989) (in evaluating validity
of investigative stop, totality of circumstances is considered).
This "totality of the circumstances" standard is seen in every
stage of the inquiry in this area.

In making such an assessment

"we focus on whether a hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of
the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would
have stopped [the defendants] to issue a warning . . . . The proper
inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could validly have
made the stop."

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978.
11

"[I]f a hypothetical

reasonable police officer would not have stopped the driver for the
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding circumstances indicate
the stop is a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional."

Id. at 979.

In other words, the officer can only make the stop upon reasonable
suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a
crime, or for a traffic violation that would normally justify a
stop, based on the "reasonable officer" standards. After-acquired
probable cause cannot retroactively justify an illegal stop.

State

v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988).
In State v. Baird, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah App.
1988) the Court recognized that
there are tree levels of police-citizen encounters
requiring different degrees of justification to be
constitutionally permissible. The Utah Supreme Court has
listed these as follows: (1) [A]n officer may approach a
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an
officer may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or
is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop," (3) an officer may
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is being
committed.State v. Baird. 94 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 quoting
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)
(quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
A traffic stop is a level two situation as it involves
detention and therefore requires a reasonable, articulable
suspicion. Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
The
traffic stop must be te*nporary and is to last no longer than is
necessary to issue a citation or a warning. It is also to be
remembered that the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, even those that only involve a brief detention short of a
traditional arrest. Anytime a police officer stops a person and
12

restrains him so that he is not free to walk away, that person has
been "seized" and his seizure nust be reasonable. United States v.
Bricmoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
In State v. Arrovo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah App.
1989) the officer stopped a vehicle for following three to eight
car lengths behind the vehicle in front of it and cited the driver
- who the officer had noted was Hispanic just before he made the
stop - for following too closely. The officer asked if he could
search his vehicle, defendant agreed whereupon 2.2 pounds of
cocaine was found inside the passenger door panel. The trial court
held that no traffic violation had occurred and ruled that the
traffic stop had been made as a pre-text to further investigate a
vehicle which he found suspicious because of Hispanic occupants and
out-of-state plates. This Court agreed that the stop was an
unconstitutional pretext to search for drugs saying that "[w]e are
persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped [the
car] and cited him for 'following too closely1 except for some
unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity."
Arroyo. 103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. This Court, however, held that
the evidence should not have been suppressed because of the consent
of the driver to the search. Consent to search, as it applies to
the facts of this case is more fully covered in Point IV, infra.
Similarly, in the instant case the officer testified that
he had observed that the Appellants1 vehicle was "following too
closely" to the vehicle in front of it. The officer stated that he
was going in the opposite direction as the Appellants1 car but was
preparing to turn around (Trans. Suppress. Hearing, p. 4
(hereinafter "R.")). He testified that Appellant's car was about
one and a half car lengths behind the vehicle in front of it and
that the vehicles were traveling approximately 60 to 65 miles per
hour. Id. The officer later stated that the car in front of
Appellants had slowed down and that they had been caught behind it.
It appeared that they wanted to take the next exit (R. 51). The
officer followed the two cars for a mile or less, which would have
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been for a minute or less, and indicated that traffic was light
(R. 51-52). The vehicles were in the outside or slow lane (R.
53). The officer further indicated that the vehicle bore out of
state plates, a fact that he noted before he turned on his light to
stop the vehicle (R. 6)•
The officer Testified that although "we write them
[following too closely citations] on a regular basis", (R. 31),
that regular basis is "one or two a month". At the same time the
officer indicated that those numbers are even lower in the nonsummer months. As it was, the officer never did issue a moving
citation. All that was issued was a warning citation. The
totality of the evidence did not cause the officer to further
investigate whether the driver was intoxicated nor was there any
evidence that any other offense was being committed or about to be
committed by either Appellant which would have given the officer a
valid reason to stop the vehicle.
From the totality of the facts presented here and the
officer's admissions that he formed an intent to investigate the
contents of Appellants1 car long before he had developed probable
cause to effect an arrest and from the guidance provided by Arroyo,
this Court should conclude the stop was a pretext to conduct a
search based on an unarticulated hunch. This Court should therefore
conclude that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States as well as Article I, Section 14
of the Constitution of Utah in so far as that Section has been
determined to be consistent or equal to its federal counterpart,
and that any evidence seized as a result of the unconstitutional
stop should have been excluded by the District Court.
b. The stop violated the protections guaranteed to
Appellants by Article I, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Utah
The wording of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution
is essentially identical to the wording of the Fourth Amendment to
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the United States Constitution with the only material exception
being that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution replaces
a semi-colon for a comma after the word "violated"•
This similarity does not necessarily imply that the
meaning of the Utah constitutional provision is the same as its
federal counterpart.

Article I, Section 14 was enacted almost 104

years after its federal counterpart was ratified.

The provision

was passed by a State which was far removed from the mentality and
life style of those living in Philadelphia and Washington.

The

State of Utah had suffered a large degree of federal involvement in
its religious and family affairs and federal troops were stationed
in the State to control its activities.

Polygamy, a religious

institution which was believed to be a sacred order by many in
authority in both religious and secular governing bodies, had been
outlawed after intense pressure was brought to bear against the
State.

Many citizens of the State continued to practice polygamy

and had a keen interest in doing all that was possible in seeing
that entry into their homes was restricted.

It is not unrealistic

to state that many of those persons practicing polygamy may have
been in a position to influence the public at large as well as
those representing them in the state legislature, or may have been
members of the legislative body themselves.

Neither is it

unreasonable to presume therefore that because of this historical
and probably pervasive attitude of alienation from ruling
authority, the drafters of the State's constitutional provision
respecting security of persons, papers, and homes intended the
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provision to give greater protection to the State's citizens than
that afforded to the citizens of the United States by that
constitution.
An analysis of the question is hindered considerably by
the dearth of cases in support of such position or any

indication

of legislative intent associated with the adoption of Article I,
Section 14, in stark contrast to the recorded debates over the
ratification of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.

The following appears to be the entire record of

the proceedings as to Article I, Section 14:
The Chairman:

Gentlemen, we will take up Section

14.
Section 14 was read and passed without amendment.
Official Reports and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt
Lake City on the 4th Day of March, 1895 to Adopt a Constitution for
the State of Utah, 319 (1898).
It is nevertheless submitted that this Court can, in an
appropriate situation, give a more liberal, independent, and
protective interpretation to the Utah Constitution than that given
to the Fourth Amendment.

The Court could adopt the view of the

Idaho Supreme Court which unanimously stated
[The] federal and state constitutions derive their power
from independent sources. [Thus,] state courts are at
liberty to find within the provisions of their own
constitutions greater protection than is afforded under
the federal constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, [citations] This is true even when
the constitutional provisions implicated contain similar
phraseology. Long gone are the days
when state courts will blindly apply United States
Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when in the
process of interpreting their own constitutions.State v.
Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n. 6, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n. 6
(1985) (emphasis added) quoted in State v. Johnson, 110
Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 (1986).
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Similar sentiments were stated by the Mississippi Supreme
Court when it stated that
We accord to the U.S. Supreme Court the utmost respect in
its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. We must,
however, reserve for this Court the sole and absolute
right to make the final interpretation of our state
Constitution and, while of great persuasion, we will not
concede that simply because the U.S. Supreme Court may
interpret a U.S. Constitutional provision that we must
give the same interpretation to essentially the same
words in a provision of our state Constitution.Penick v.
State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983).
Other states have also taken the lead in construing their
state constitutional provisions as providing additional protection
to those already granted by the Fourth Amendment.

In State v.

Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985) the Alaska Supreme Court
found that it should "construe Alaska's constitutional provisions
such as Article I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to
those granted by the United States Supreme Court under the federal
constitution."
decision.

The Washington Supreme Court made a similar

State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984).
Furthermore, Utah case law explicitly suggests the

possibility of a different construction for Article I, Section 14
than is given the Fourth Amendment.

In the case of State v. Watts,

Chief Justice Hall stated that though [we have declined]
to depart in this case from our consistent refusal
heretofore to interpret article I, section 14 of our
constitution in a manner different from the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution, we have by no
means ruled out the possibility of doing so in some
future case. Indeed, choosing to give the Utah
Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove
to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the
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federal courts.State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n. 8
(Utah 1988).
Other cases in which the need to brief state
constitutional issues have been urged, with an obvious eye toward
potentially expanding the coverage of the state provisions, include
State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) (in
which Justice Durham specifically stated that the Court approved
the formula of scholastic commentary and analytic technique for
analyzing state constitutional issues set forth by the Supreme
Court of Vermont in State v. Jewett. 500 A.2d 233, 236-38 (Vt.
1985) ; and State v. Hvgh. 711 P. 2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
As part of briefing this Court on state constitutional
issues which may be applicable to a certain case, this Court
requires that the matter be touched on at the trial level. See
State v. Johnson. 104 Utah Adv. Reports 34, 35 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The problem with such a requirement is that counsel is
effectively precluded from making an argument, because there is no
case law to support his argument.

This results in a sort of

cognitive dissonance on the part of the practitioner who feels the
need to state that the state constitution may provide greater
protection then the federal constitution, even though they are
essentially identical, but cannot make an argument which can carry
any weight at the trial level because of the lack of cases and
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precedent for the argued position.

Therefore, in light of the

present situation the practitioner simply does not bring up the
point.

If it is brought up, as it was in the present case, there

is no incentive, or point, in making more then just the barest
allegation that the state constitution provides greater protection
in the area.
In this case, for the reasons touched on above, counsel
for the Appellants did not argue specifically at the trial level
that the Utah Constitution gives any greater protection to the
right of a Utah citizen to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures.

However, in the Motion to Suppress filed by Defendant

Lovegren, it is specifically mentioned that the motion is based,
inter alia "on the Constitution of Utah"

(See Exhibit B).

A

similar statement is seen in the Motion to Suppress filed by
Defendant Southern (See Exhibit C ) .
Also, it is clear that the State and the officer involved
perceive that the officer was acting pursuant to Section 77-7-15,
Utah Code Annotated (1953).

Any time that a police officer acts

pursuant to this statute, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution is implicitly raised and is applicable to any
discussion based on search and seizure issues, and whether the
arguments submitted by counsel are primarily based on federal case
law is immaterial.
If this Court were to take a position on the relative and
independent protections founded in Article I, Section 14, it is
felt that the conflicting federal interpretations of the Fourth
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Amendment to the United States Constitution would be unraveled and
police officers and practitioners and the general citizenry of the
state would be able to rely on a bright line - if not a "brighter
line" - approach to many of the issues raised in this area, issues
which are aggravated by continuing federal decisions.

Such a

bright line approach would be proper in light of the history of the
state at the time that Article I, Section 14 was enacted and would
be welcome to all those persons called upon to act under and to
interpret Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States on a
daily basis.
Such a bright line approach will also serve to curtail
abuses by police and other governmental officers who may now find
it convenient to violate the law because of conflicting and
cumbersome federal decisions, which often serve to generate more
problems and issues then they remedy.
Based on the foregoing it is clear that this Court would
not be remiss in holding that the actions of the officer in making
a pretextual stop so that he might investigate and satisfy his
unarticulated hunches were unconstitutional under the provisions of
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even if this Court
is not satisfied the federal constitutions or prior state case law
interpreting the state provisions as equal to the federal
provisions did not demand such a determination.

Further, this

Court need not wait for the state Supreme Court to make a decision
on this issue as that Court is in no better position to make the
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decision than is this Court because of the lack of case authority
and legislative history and because that Court is less likely to
review this issue because of the statutory restrictions on its
jurisdiction to review the type of criminal cases where this issue
is most likely to be raised.
POINT II
ASSUMING THE INITIAL STOP OF APPELLANTS1 CAR WAS PROPER,
THE SUBSEQUENT AND EXTENDED DETENTION OF APPELLANTS
RESULTED IN A DE FACTO ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
It has been held that whenever a police officer detains a
person, and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that
person.

As there has been a seizure the Fourth Amendment applies

in determining whether the seizure of the person has been
unreasonable.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).

See State

v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 122 (Utah 1976).
A police officer may not act on a hunch, speculation, or
mere suspicion.

Terry. 392 U.S at 27. The officer may act on

specific, reasonable inferences based on the facts, which he is
permitted to analyze in light of his experience.

Id.

This

"reasonable suspicion", which does not rise to the level of
"probable cause", has been described as a combination of specific
and articulable facts together with reasonable inferences from
those facts, which, in light of the officer's experience,
reasonably justify a belief that the person to be detained had
committed, or was about to commit a crime.
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984).

Id.

See State v.

Additionally, "an

investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
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is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.

Similarly, the

investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in
a short period of time"
(1983).

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500

It is clear that a police officer cannot seek to

substantiate his hunches or suspicions of wrongdoing by resorting
to tactics which approach the conditions of an arrest.
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).

See Dunawav

Also, the burden of proof is on

the State to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on
the basis of reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope
and duration to satisfy the limits of an investigative seizure.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
As has been shown, it is recognized that police officers
can detain persons in certain situations under less than probable
cause.

The United States Supreme Court case of United States v.

Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) is clear in saying that
it is permissible to stop an individual upon reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity for the purpose of questioning limited to the
purpose of the stop.

The seizure in Brignoni-Ponce was to verify

or dispel the suspicion that the immigration laws were being
violated.

It should be noted that the Court made it clear that the

stop could only be for the purpose of questioning the driver and
his passengers about their citizenship status and to explain
suspicious circumstances.

The Court went on to say that "any

further detention or search must be based on consent or probable
cause."

Brianoni-Ponce, 462 U.S. at 881-882.
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Similarly, in

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) the Supreme Court upheld
the temporary detention of a man on less than probable cause while
a search warrant was being executed.

The Court in that case held

the intrusion was justified by substantial law enforcement
interests such that the seizure of the man could be made on
articulable suspicion not amounting to probable cause.

Michigan v.

Summers. 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981).
As mentioned above, the test for determining whether the
detention of a person falls within the guidelines of the Fourth
Amendment exception recognized by Terry is whether there are
specific and articulable facts present which serve to give rise to
a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped, is, or is about to
be, engaged in criminal activity.
However, when the length of the stop and the degree of
intrusiveness becomes excessive there has been a de facto arrest
without probable cause and the Constitution has been violated.

In

making the determination of a de facto arrest the U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that
[i]n assessing whether a detention is too long in
duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we
consider it appropriate to examine whether the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,
during which time it was necessary to detain the
defendant. [citations] A court making this assessment
should take care to consider whether the police are
acting in a swiftly developing situation. . . .United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (Terry and the cases that
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followed it, permit only brief investigative stops and extremely
limited searches based on reasonable suspicion and do not provide
the police with a commission to employ whatever investigative
techniques they deem appropriate).
It is clear that the length of the detention is not the
only factor in determining whether a de facto arrest has occurred.
In Royer the lower court found that the fact that the police had
placed their suspect in a small enclosed area and confronted him
with two officers, told him that they were narcotics officers and
suspected him of transporting narcotics, retrieved his luggage and
took it into their possession, and never told him that he was free
to leave was, as a practical matter, the equivalent of an arrest.
The Supreme Court agreed holding that the show of official
authority would surely give a reasonable person the idea that he
was not free to leave and that he was being detained by the police.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 502-03.
Though, in the instant case, there is no indication
within the record as to the exact amount of time spent by the
officer in detaining the Defendants before their arrest the officer
did testify that he first observed the Defendants at "around 10:00
O'clock in the morning" (R.4).
officer's testimony.

"Around" is not defined in the

He followed the Defendants for about one

minute and turned on his light after that time had passed (R. 5-6).
The police report for some unknown reason does not indicate the
time of arrest.

The very next time that is listed on any sort of

official document is 12:26 PM, when the Passenger submitted to a
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urine sample at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center in Provo,
Utah.

The police report is also devoid of any indications as to

where the Defendants were transported after their arrests, the
results of any interrogations by the police, etc., and how long
these might have taken.
However, it is possible to show that there was a de facto
arrest of the Defendants based on the actions of the officer.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the officer did not make a
pretextual traffic stop, as discussed in Point I, supra., then the
main reason for the stop, the investigation of a possible traffic
violation, ceased to exist as soon as the officer issued his
warning citation and reasonably satisfied himself that the driver
had a valid drivers license and that other routine traffic matters
were in order.

When the officer approached the Passenger and asked

him for his drivers license, the officer was detaining the
Passenger as well as the Driver who didn't feel free to leave the
scene without his friend, on a hunch and on the mere speculation
that because the inside of their car was cluttered, because they
were from out-of-state, because they carried a road map, and
because they wore sunglasses, they were drug smugglers.

This

detention progressed to a search of the interior of the vehicle, to
a search of the Passenger (but not the Driver) for "weapons", to
the removal of the keys from the Passenger's pocket despite here
not being a weapon or contraband, and ultimately to the search of
the trunk of the car, the contents of the trunk, and the interior
of the contents of the trunk, all at the officer's urging.
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All of this progressively intrusive activity by the
officer took place after the purported purpose of the stop had been
addressed and satisfactorily resolved by issuance of a warning
citation but before the officer determined that he had probable
cause to make an arrest. While on the scene the officer claimed
that he was looking for evidence of alcohol influence (R. 13), he
appeared relatively uninterested in checking for the odor of an
alcoholic beverage or in having the Driver perform any field
sobriety tests (R. 54-56).

At the suppression hearing the officer

admitted he was sure that they weren't under the influence of
alcohol (R. 56) and that he was looking for evidence to support his
"suspicions" of drug use and drug smuggling. (See R. 28-29, 35,
50) .
Essentially, this officer attempted to create a category
"2(a)" level of police-citizen encounter - somewhere between the
brief, limited, investigatory stop allowed by Section 77-7-15 and a
full-blown arrest based on probable cause. This Court should take
care not to ratify such a new category or to allow a perversion of
established Fourth Amendment principal, whether the offending
officer blatantly violates the protections or, as here, attempts to
obscure his violations by feigning repeated requests for consent.
After issuance of the warning citation, Appellants were
effectively made the subject of a de facto arrest because they were
detained beyond the time and scope necessary to the purposes of the
initial stop; their continued detention was not based on an
articulated reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing much less on
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probable cause. This Court should rule such arrest invalid as not
founded on probable cause and the search incident thereto likewise
illegal.
POINT III
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF THE PASSENGER WAS CONDUCTED
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT REASONABLE SUSPICION PARTICULAR TO THE
PASSENGER; EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE PAT-DOWN WAS
NOT SUBJECT TO SEIZURE
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Section 77-7-16
allow a police officer to pat down the outer clothing of a person
without putting his hands within the pockets or under the outer
surface of their garments until an object which is, or which could
be a weapon, is found.

The officer may then reach into the pockets

or under the clothing to remove the weapon or to determine in fact
whether it is a weapon.

The sole justification for the search is

the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and is to
be "confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the
assault of the police officer."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.

The

officer making the search must be able to articulate a reasonable
belief and point to specific and articulable facts that the person
was armed and presently dangerous and which would warrant the
intrusion.
146 (1972).

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
The facts of each case must be judged against an

objective standard:
[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief1 that the action taken was
appropriate? [citations] Anything less would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based
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on nothing more substantial than inarticulable hunches, a
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction,
[citations] And simple, 'good faith on the part of the
arresting officer is not enough.'Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
at 22 quoting Beck v. Ohio. 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
This objective standard was adopted by the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Baumaaertel, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1988).
Section 77-7-16 reads in full, "A peace officer who has stopped a
person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a
dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other person
is in danger." It was held in the case of State v. Roybal, 716
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) that the section must be interpreted to meet
the constitutional requirements of Terry.
Terry makes it clear that a police officer is not
entitled to act on a vague or unarticulated hunch, mere
speculation, or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion; but only
on the specific reasonable inferences the officer is entitled to
drawn from the facts in light of his experience. Terry, 392 U.S.
at 27. The Court concluded in its opinion
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity might be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Terry, 392
U.S at 30.
The narrow scope of Terry does not permit a frisk for
weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the
person to be frisked. Therefore, any search outside of Terry is
either unconstitutional or must be supported by the stricter
standard of probable cause.
In the instant case the officer testified that the driver
of the vehicle was "nervous", which made him (the officer) nervous.
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Nervousness by itself, in any case, is not sufficient to
give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person is committing or
about to commit a crime. Nor does a statement of mere nervousness
on the part of a police officer rise to the level of specific and
articulable facts which, when taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion
against the Defendant. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
It has been held in numerous cases that evidence of
nervous behavior or so-called "furtive gestures" or movements, such
as moving around, looking around, "slouching down", "hunching
down", etc., without more, does not rise to the level of
articulable suspicion of wrong-doing. See State v. Schlosser, 108
Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah 1989) (acting "fidgety" not sufficient
to rise to level of articulable suspicion); State v. Mendoza. 748
P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987) (nervous behavior does not rise to level
of reasonable suspicion); State v. Holmes, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 74,
77 (Utah App. 1989) (furtive movements or gestures alone are
insufficient to constitute probable cause for search or arrest and
other factors must be shown which, in the totality of the
circumstances, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to
believe that there is evidence of criminal activity); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah App. 1988) (failure to make eye
contact, as nervous conduct, when confronted by a Highway Patrol
trooper is consistent with innocent, as well as criminal behavior);
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 944-45 (Utah App. 1988) (nervous
behavior can have no weight in determining if there is reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity); People v. Superior Court of Yolo
County, 3 Cal.3d 807, 821-24 (1970) (moving around within car not
sufficient to give probable cause to search); United States v.
Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir. 1980) ("slouching" is not
sufficient to justify stop and avoidance of eye contact can have no
weight whatsoever); United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th
Cir. 1977) (same).
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The officer indicated at the suppression hearing that
[t]he more I asked [Mr. Lovegren] the more nervous he became."
(R. 10). The officer also stated that "When I asked him about the
trip specifically about the trip where he had been, who he had been
with and he became extremely nervous." When asked why he concluded
that Mr. Lovegren was nervous he stated, "His heart was beating so
hard that it was making his shirt move." (R. 11). [This Court
should reflect on this rather remarkable statement by the officer
when it assesses the validity of the officers claim of consent to
search that is challenged hereinbelow.] The officer further stated
that "He was just [sic] had a nervous nature about him. He would
not give me eye contact when answering questions. And his eyes
would dart around as if he were searching for an answer or
something." Id.
It is clear from the authority given above that the
courts give little or no weight to manifestations of so-called
"nervous" behavior, or to furtive movements, in developing probable
cause to search or arrest or in showing reasonable suspicion for a
pat-down search for weapons. This authority is obviously
applicable to the instant case.
The officer felt that the nervous behavior of Mr.
Lovegren was an indicia of drug trafficking. However, failure to
make eye contact and other so-called types of nervous behavior are
characteristics which can be attributed to the innocent party as a
result of finding himself in the presence of a law enforcement
officer, an unpleasant experience for most persons in any case,
whether they are guilty of any wrong-doing or not. To say that
nervous behavior alone is a reliable indicia of criminal behavior
is to ignore, as the cases in this area suggest, normal human
behavior.
Also, observing, interpreting, and articulating the
supposed reasons and rationale for "nervous behavior" calls for a
totally subjective analysis on the part of the person making the
observations. Such subjective observations and interpretation,
11
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without more, are an inherently inaccurate indicator of human guilt
or wrongdoing and enjoy no reliability at r.ll.
In addition to indications of nervousness, the officer
indicated he noticed that the interior of the vehicle was
cluttered. He noticed pop and beer cans on the floor and seeing a
red cooler in the back seat. He saw several cigarette packages and
cigarette ashes in the vehicle (See R. 9) as well as a road map.
Based on these observations the officer concluded that the
Appellants were living out of their car and smuggling drugs. (R.
36-38).
It should likewise be clear that the officer is not
entitled to give any weight to the fact that the car in which the
Appellants were riding was cluttered. Cigarette ashes and butts,
empty pop and beer cans, and a cooler in the back seat are just as
indicative of the short one day trip as it may be indicative of the
longer trip. Even had there been evidence or testimony that the
Appellants were living out of the car such evidence or testimony
cannot be accorded any weight as evidence of criminal wrong-doing.
Many law-abiding and innocent persons are guilty of having a
cluttered or messy automobile.
The officer also made note of the fact that "[b]oth
suspects at the time were, it was in the summer they both had dark
glasses on. I could not observe their eyes. They were that dark.
One had mirrored sunglasses on. It made them a little suspicious
as to what was going on." (R. 9 ) . (However, he did later admit
that "A lot of people wear sunglasses and there is nothing wrong
with that." (R. 44)).
The officer also testified that the driver's eyes were
"glassy, blood shot, similar to what I had seen in other cases
involving either drugs and/or alcohol," (R. 10) and that [the
Passenger's] eyes were also red and blood shot just as the drivers
were," (R. 12), Nevertheless, as has been noted he did not find it
necessary to have the Appellants perform the standard battery of
tests designed to confirm or ally his purported suspicions. The

31

reasonable and logical inference would be that if there was a
question involving the fitness of the Driver to operate the
vehicle, then he would be subjected to a field sobriety test. A
logical and rational person would not expect the officer to ignore
the Driver and perform a pat-down search of the Passenger. It is
argued by Appellants that the officer's lack of real concern with
determining the Driver's fitness to drive in spite of noted
objective indications that might normally cause him to request
field tests, belied his actual lack of concern with alcohol
offenses, his preconceived intent to search the car for drugs, and
his dogged determination that every factor he came upon supported
that pre-formed intent to search.
From the nervousness he noted in the Driver, the general
condition of the car, and some indication that the Passenger may
have been under the influence of "something", the officer decided
that he would search the passenger. Interestingly, the search took
place almost immediately after the officer had been told by Mr.
Lovegren that the key to the trunk was not available (See R. 1618). In his pat-down search of the Passenger he felt an object
which, the officer stated, he thought could be a weapon (R. 18).
Without asking the Passenger what the object was, the officer went
into the pocket and pulled out the object, which ended up being a
set of car keys with a ring which matched the ring containing the
vehicle ignition key. Instead of returning the keys to the
Passenger's pocket, as he had obviously determined that it was not
a weapon or contraband, the officer began to ask questions about
the keys.
Assuming (without agreeing) that the officer had a valid
reason to go into the pocket of the Passenger, the officer was not
constitutionally justified in removing the keys from the
Passenger's pocket, after there identity had been determined.
Neither was he justified in using them to further aid him in his
quest to locate the contraband which he felt was present in the
vehicle. The case law is clear that what can be seized from the
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person being patted down is restricted to weapons, contraband
reasonably seized while engaging in the pat-down and fruits of a
crime, etc., which were reasonably discovered during the course of
a properly applied pat-down search for weapons, and which fell
within the scope of the search for those weapons. See United
States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 702-04 (1983); Florida v. Rover. 460
U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 147-49
(1972). The keys were none of the above and should have been
replaced in the Passengerfs pocket.
It is obvious that from the beginning the officer
suspected that the Appellants were in possession of some sort of
contraband although he had no articulable reasonable suspicion or
probable cause in support of his suspicions. He therefore
unreasonably detained his suspects using the purported
"nervousness" of the Driver, his own alleged nervousness, and every
other factor he observed as a basis for a Terry search of the
Passenger. However, as has been shown, none of these factors alone
or together were sufficient to meet the test of a Terry search of
the person who was acting "nervous" (the Driver) much less the
Passenger. Nor did the officer testify to a sufficient reason why
the keys felt like a weapon nor was there valid reason to seize the
keys, even if there was a reasonable basis for the pat-down or for
entry into the pocket.
This Court should conclude that no valid reasonable
suspicion supported a pat-down search of the Passenger, that entry
of his pocket was not supported by articulable suspicion of the
presence of a weapon within, that seizure of the keys was not
justified, that the use of the keys to search the car was tainted
by the prior illegal search and seizure of the keys, and that the
ultimate seizure of the contraband was therefore "come at by the
exploitation of that illegality ...." Wong Sun v United States, 371
US 471 (1963).
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POINT IV
THE SEARCH OF APPELLANTS' AUTOMOBILE CANNOT BE BASED ON
CONSENT
The test to be applied in the search issue is whether
under all of the circumstances, a fair minded person, giving due
consideration to the rights and interests of the public, as well as
to those of the suspect, would judge the search to be an
unreasonable intrusion into the rights of the suspect.
White, 577 P.2d 552, 553-54 (Utah 1978).
consent is given to the search.

State v.

This test is satisfied if

Id. at 554.

M

[W]here the validity

of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority."

Florida v. Rover, 460

U.S. 491, 497 and cases therein (1983); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
972, 981 (Utah App. 1988).

Voluntary consent is that which was in

fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion,
express or implied.

State v. Arroyo. 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35

(Utah App. 1989); Sierra. 754 P.2d at 980; Schneckloth v.
Bustamonter 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

"The issue of whether a

person's consent to a search is voluntary • is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances1"
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 980 quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 227 (1973).

Should this Court determine that the initial stop

and/or the subsequent extended detention and/or the seizure of the
trunk keys from the Passenger's pocket was [were] improper, the
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appropriate inquiry then is "whether, granting establishment of the
prior illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by the exploitation of that illegality or instead
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint•"

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (quoting Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).

In other words, was

the purported consent to search voluntarily given, did it extend to
the area where the controlled substance was found, and did the
consent "purge" or "cure" any prior illegality? Appellants think
not for the reasons set forth below.
Furthermore, though it has been held that the trial
court's factual evaluation underlying its decision to grant or deny
a motion to suppress ought not to be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous, State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987), the
only indication of the trial court's findings regarding the facts
involved in the consent is found on pages 93 and 94 of the
transcript of the suppression hearing. Unfortunately that brief
recitation of the Court's thinking does not provide this Court with
much of a basis for scrutinizing the factual evaluation underlying
the ruling. Nevertheless, from that transcript, this Court should
be able to recognize the following conflict concerning the issue of
consent.
While the officer testified that he asked verbally for a
consent to search the interior of the car, and received an
affirmative response from its occupants, (R. 13) the Passenger
stated that the officer did not ask anyone for permission to look
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through the car; he just told the two men to stand by the front of
the car and started to look through it
testified likewise

(R. 64). The Driver

(R. 73).

A similar conflict of opinion exists regarding the claim
of consent for the search of the trunk of the car

(See R. 15-16).

Again, the officer claims that he asked for and received permission
to search the trunk, but could not at that time because the Driver
stated that he did not have the trunk key.

According to the

officer after he finally obtained the key to the trunk from the
Passenger, the Driver took the key and attempted to open the trunk,
though the officer admits that he may have assisted him in getting
the trunk open after Mr. Lovegren claimed that the key did not fit
(R. 19, 45-46).

The officer then stated that he asked for and

obtained permission to look within the suitcases themselves

(R.

22) .
Both Appellants maintain that the officer never asked for
permission to search the trunk or the suitcases.

Once he found the

key in the Passenger's pocket pursuant to the pat-down search for
weapons they claim that the officer went directly to the trunk,
opened it, removed a suitcase from the trunk, opened it, and began
to search through it (R. 65-67; 73-75) eventually finding the
controlled substance.
There is no conflict, however, concerning the fact that
the officer did not ask for permission to search within the
contents of the suitcase, specifically the cookie box which
contained the controlled substance.
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The officer claimed that as he

felt had received permission to look in the trunk, he therefore
assumed he also had permission to look within the box which was in
the suitcase which was in the trunk (R. 4 8 ) .
a. The totality of the circumstances does not
support a finding that either Appellant
consented to a search of the vehicle or its
contents
Appellants recognize the heavy practical burden any
Defendant must bear when it is alleged that the sworn testimony of
a law officer is inaccurate; Appellants are also mindful of their
burden to persuade this Court that the trial Court's findings in
support of its ruling was "clearly erroneous". And although there
are numerous instances where the officer and the Appellants
disagree on the events surrounding the search, this Court should
consider several undisputed facts as evidence that in light of
totality of the circumstances, consent was not given and the trial
Court erred in concluding that " I believe I am inclined to believe
the officer in this matter."
1) The Passenger removed the trunk keys from the
ignition key chain at the steering column and attempted to conceal
them from the officer (R.62-3).
2) When found in possession of the trunk keys the
Passenger denied that they belonged to the Driver's car or that
they fit the trunk lock (R. 19, 43-44, 65).
3) The Driver denied having a key to the trunk (R.
16 46, 7 7 ) .
4) Appellants denied having any luggage (R. 14).
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5) Before the officer looked into the cookie box,
the Driver attempted to conceal the cookie box which contained the
controlled substance by throwing clothing on top of it (R. 23) and
later grabbed the box out of the officer's hands, claiming "you
can't have that. That is mine." (R. 23-24).
Even disregarding the disputed facts and focusing on
these uncontroverted versions of the events, this Court should
conclude that it is logically inconsistent for the trial Court to
have concluded that consent to enter the trunk was given at the
same time that attempts were made to conceal the key and dissuade
the officer and cover the cookie box. Interestingly, or perhaps
inadvertently, the State's Bill of Particulars reflects this
inconsistency. In response to Defendant Lovegren's Motion for a
description of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the
various counts, the Bill states that Lovegren became "nervous and
vague" and that before the officer "reached down and looked in the
box," Lovegren "tried to conceal the cookie box" (Bill of
Particulars, paragraphs 1 and 3).
Appellants do not ask this Court to decide the truth of
the disputed facts. Rather, it is urged that in even light of the
undisputed facts it cannot be concluded that consent was granted
for entry into the trunk and that the trial Court was clearly
erroneous in ruling otherwise.
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b. Assuming that consent was given for a search,
taking the facts in their best light, the
consent was coerced from the Defendants because
of their de facto arrest
The facts supporting the argument that Appellants were
made subject of a de facto arrest have been discussed in Point II,
supra.

Based on the length of time that the officer detained the

Defendants, and the degree of "pushing" by the officer to obtain
"consent" to search the interior of the vehicle, the passenger, and
the trunk of the car, including its contents and the interior of
its contents, a de facto arrest occurred.

It is clear that if

consent was given to search it was coerced by the actions of the
officer who was bent on conducting a search from early after the
initial stop (R.28-29, 34-35). According to the passenger,
Appellants had been detained for a considerable period of time
before the officer allowed the Driver to come back to his car (R.
62-63).

The officer's progressive, intrusive, and time-consuming

probings of the vehicle's interior, the Passenger, and the trunk
and its contents then took place.

If consent was given at all, it

can be safely inferred that the Defendants hoped that the officer
would be satisfied with just searching in his current target area,
and then they would be free to go.
In

Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 501-04 (1983) the

United States Supreme Court held that the actions of the officers
involved, which consisted, among other things, of detaining the
defendant for an unreasonable time, severely restricting his
movements, and taking control of his luggage, served to negate the
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consent that the defendant had earlier given to have one of his
suitcases opened by the police.
The facts of this case are similar in that the officer
detained Appellants for a considerable amount of time while he
conducted his searches.

Additionally, as has been shown earlier,

the Defendants did not feel free to go, even though there was no
legal basis present for their detention.

Should this Court

conclude that consent to search was given, it should further
consider whether the actions of the officer in unreasonably
detaining Appellants while progressively expanding the area of his
concern by searching first the interior, then the Passenger, the
trunk of the vehicle, the suitcases, and the contents of the suit
cases essentially simultaneous with his "requests" implied an
apparent authority to do as he wished with or without consent and
consequently served to negate any consent which may have been
given.
If the "consent" to search was given but was the product
of the aggressive actions of the officer rather than of the
considered agreement of the Driver, this Court should rule that
such consent was not voluntary but was a mere submission to the
asserted authority of the officer, Sierra, supra.
c. If valid consent was given for the search of the
vehicle, the consent did not extend to the
cookie box
There is no dispute between Appellants and the officer
regarding the fact that no permission was sought for a search of
the inside of the cookie box, and none was given (R. 48, 57, 67,
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76).

As was shown earlier in this section, before the officer

looked into the box, the Driver attempted to conceal it.

The

officer removed the box from the suitcase without first asking
permission and without giving the Driver an opportunity to respond.
The officer then immediately twisted and distorted the box so that
he could look inside, whereupon he saw the contraband.
Should this Court conclude that a valid and voluntary
consent was given for a search of the trunk area, it must then be
determined whether that consent can be implied to logically and
legally extend to the cookie box. Even if it is assumed for the
sake of argument that the Driver allowed the officer access to the
trunk and the interior of the suitcases, it is clear from the
uncontroverted evidence that the Driver's accommodations ended at
that point. From his attempts to conceal the box, from his
unmistakable assertions of possessory rights to it, and from the
testimony of all witnesses that no consent was sought or received
for a search of the box, one could not have reasonably presumed
that his prior consent, if any, logically extended to the box.
Because the Driver's "consent" obviously did not logically extend
to authority to search the cookie box, neither can the "consent"
legally extend to the box. See Schneckloth, supra.
Naturally, because Appellants have raised several
questions about the existence, validity, and scope of the claimed
consent to search, and because the record below does not
specifically address these issues or otherwise give a clear picture
of the evaluative processes employed in reaching the decision to
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deny Appellants1 Motions to Suppress, this Court may consider an
order of remand for the purpose of the issuance of Findings of Fact
sufficient for this Court to review the propriety of the ruling.
Appellants respectfully suggest an alternate approach.
In State v. Strain, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 11-12 (Utah 1989),
faced with a similar situation involving the validity of a
confession in light of a claim by Defendant that the confession was
coerced, and not having a record sufficient to review that specific
issue, the Utah Supreme Court remanded with instructions to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman noted
our remand for a determination of the question of
voluntariness raises the possibility of an avoidable
additional remand and appeal. . . For the benefit of the
trial court and the parties, I think we should indicate
that while the State has contended that 'it may be
possible . . .to find . . . that [the party's] improper
statements did not actually induce defendant to confess1,
if such a finding were based on nothing more than the
evidence presented to us at this point, there would be
some doubt as to such a finding's sustainability.State v.
Strain, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11-12.
Justice Zimmerman's comments are applicable to the facts of this
case.

Because in this matter such evidentiary hearing has already

been conducted and should it be determined that the present state
of the record is such that, owing to the undisputed evidence, a
conclusion that the search of Appellant's vehicle cannot be
justified for one or more of the foregoing reasons, this Court
should consider the "possibility of an avoidable additional appeal
and remand" by issuing its decision compelling suppression of the
evidence.
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CONCLUSION
On the pretext of a minor traffic violation, Appellants1
automobile was stopped by an officer determined to conduct a search
on the strength of an unarticulated hunch that they were
transporting drugs. After the purported reason for the initial stop
was addressed and resolved by issuance of a warning citation,
Appellants were unreasonably detained while the officer nosed
around in their car eventually discovering a controlled substance.
The officer claimed consent was given for the snowballing search.
From the undisputed facts it is clear either that no consent was
given, that the "consent" was coerced, or that the consent did not
extend to the area in which the controlled substance was found.
While Appellants urge that the search was conducted in violation of
the guarantees set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, it is further argued that
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides
Appellants greater protection and security in their persons and
effects so that if the seizure is found not to have violated the
provisions of the Fourth Amendment, it surely violated the broader
guarantees of Article I, Section 14. This Court should therefore
remand with instructions to suppress the seized evidence.
Dated 2 August, 1989.

Respectfully submitted by:

THOMAS H. MEANS
Attorney for Robert D. Lovegren

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
Attorney for Gregory W. Southern
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date below-noted
he/she served a four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of the Appellants on the following, in the manner prescribed
by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure No. 5(b)(1), by either depositing
the same in the U.S. Mails, addressed as below-noted, with all
postage and other fees pre-paid, or by delivering the same to the
following person[s] personally, or by delivering the same to a
person of suitable age and discretion at the address[es] belownoted .
Dated this

day of

, 1989.

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT/SENTENCE STAYED

)

vs.

) CASE NUMBER

GREGORY WADE SOUTHERN and
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN,

) BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendant.

CR 88 284

) Reported: Richard C. Tatton, CSR

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for
pronouncement of judgment and sentence on the 28th day of April,
1989.

Deputy Utah County Attorney James Taylor appearing for or

on behalf of the

State of Utah.

Defendant Southern appearing in

person and represented by attorney Michael Esplin and defendant
Lovegren appearing in person and represented by attorney Thomas
Means.

The Court, having reviewed the Presentence Investigation

Reports and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and
enters the following Judgment and Sentence:
J U D G M E N T
The defendants Gregory Wade Southern and Robert D.
Lovegren having entered a plea of no contest on the 27th day of
February, 1989, to the offense oi Lount I - Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree

Felony, as charged in the Information; the defendants having been
fully advised in detail by the Court of their constitutional
rights and of the effects and results of the no contest plea, and
there being no legal reason why judgment should not be
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown
or appearing to the Court, it is ordered and adjudged that the
defendants be sentenced as follows:
S E N T E N C E
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendant Gregory Wade Southern is sentenced to be confined in
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than
one nor more than fifteen years.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendant Robert D. Lovegren is sentenced to be confined in the
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than one
nor more than fifteen years.
Execution of the above sentences are stayed pending an
appeal.

In the event that the appeal is not timely pursued or in

the event the Court is affirmed, the Court will then consider
probation as opposed to the sentences at that time.
Dated this 28th day of April, 1989.

THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Defendant
81 East Center
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84603
[801] 377-7980
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

v

]
]|

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

;

ROBERT D. LOVEGREN,
Defendant.

]|

No. CR 88 296

]

Defendant, by and through his attorney, Thomas H. Means, and
pursuant to Section 77-35-12, Utah Code, the Constitution of the
United States, and the Constitution of Utah, hereby moves that this
Court suppress all evidence siezed from Defendant or from his
automobile by officers of the Utah Highway Patrol for the reason
that such siezure was without authority of warrant and was not
otherwise permitted by law.
Dated this 22nd day of November, 1988.

Thomas H. Means
Attorney for Defendant

1

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date below-noted
he/she served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to
Suppress on the following, in the manner prescribed by Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure No. 5(b)(1), by either depositing the same in
the U.S. Mails, addressed as below-noted, with all postage and
other fees pre-paid, or by delivering the same to the following
person[s] personally, or by delivering the same to a person of
suitable age and discretion at the address[es] below-noted.
Dated this ^ A

day of

(Ufjuu^^^.

1988.

Steven B. Killpack
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah, 84601
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1
2
3
4

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN ( 1 0 0 9 )
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P. 0 . Box WLW
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: 373-4912
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

6

STATE OF UTAH

7
STATE OF UTAH,

8

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Plaintiff,

9
10

vs.
GREGORY WADE SOUTHERN,

11

Case No. CR-88-294
Defendant.

12
13

COMES NOW the defendant, Gregory Wade Southern, by and

14

through his attorney of record, Michael D. Esplin, and hereby

15

moves the court for an order suppressing the evidence obtained

16

pursuant to the search of the person and vehicle in which

17

defendant was riding.

18

defendant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure

19

guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Utah

20

State Constitution in that the officer conducting said search did

21

not have probable cause to justify said search.

22

DATED this

*??

Said search was made in violation of the

day of October, 1988.

23

^ ^ L

24
Attorney for Defendant
1. NELSON.

1

2

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I hereby c e r t i f y that I delivered a copy of the foregoing
Motion to Suppress Evidence to the Utah County Attorney, 100 East
3 J Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84601, t h i s
J7
day of
October, 1988.
4
5
6
7
8

9
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17
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STEVEN B. KILLPACK, #1808
Utah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (80J)370-8026
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DESTRTCT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAHr
Plaintiff,

BILL OF PARTICULARS

vs.
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN,
Case No. CR 88-296
Defendant(s)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through Deputy Utah
County Attorney, James R. Taylor, who provides the following Bill
of Particulars:
(1)

Regarding Count I;

The defendant was the driver

of an automobile northbound on Interstate 15 in the Spanish Fork
area on June 18, 1988, just before 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
The vehicle was stopped and whiJe being questioned regarding
minor traffic offenses the Defendant became extremely nervous and
vague.

While searching the trunk the,Defendant opened^a small

blue bag containing clothing, zig-zag papers and a COOKLe box.
The defendant threw levis on the cookie box, showed every part of
the suitcase, but tr^ied^ to_ggtngeal the gpokie box.

The officer

reached down and looked in the box and could see a row of cookies

in front and a bag in the back of the box that appeared to
contain cocaine.

The defendant grabbed the box and jsjn._4^V£QU

_can't have that, it's mine."
box.

He then headed for the car with the

The defendant tossed the box to the other occupant of the

car who fled the scene on foot.

The cookie box was located later

in the proximity of the other defendant.

The bag contained 165.5

grams of cocaine. .Intent to distribute can be inferred from
possession of cocaine of that quantity and value.

Blood tests

given to the defendant resulted in a presumptive positive for V
cocaine.

Additional details regarding Count I are included in

the police report which has been supplied to counsel for the ^
defendant.
(2)

Regarding Count II:

During the search described

in Paragraph (1), zig-zag papers, a cigarette package with a
straw and one-edge razor blade, a film canister with cocaine in
it, and a plate with the appearance of cocaine residue on it were
all locateeTwithin the car.

All of these items are items

commonly used for the ingestion or use of controlled substances.
y^ (3) Regarding Count III:

As described in Paragraph

(1), during the search of the trunk the defendant first attempted
to conceal the box containing__the_cocaine and then grabbed the
bqx fxom the officer .aj^d-Jthrew...dJL^tg_a co-defendant who fLed the
scene.

(4)

Regarding Count IV:

When the vehicle was stopped

as described in Paragraph (1), the defendant was operating the
motor vehicle.

A beer can, open and partly full, was located

under the driver's seat in the front.
(5)

Evidence regarding Count V has aLready been stated

in the preceeding paragraphs and is included in the police report
supplied to the defendant in this matter.
Q^

Dated this

day of

ju&<5tjuudieu<^~

.AMESyR. TAYLOR
.
Depj^ty Utah Coun£y^?Vttor

t

1988.

r

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Bill of Particulars to Thomas Means, attorney
for defendant, 81 East Center, Provo, Utah
day of November, 1988.
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